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组织农业土地的生产有几种明确形式,在生产某些农作物时倾向于用工资契约,而其他一些农作物则倾向于用租赁契约,还有一些农作物常常用分成制。对此,一个流行的解释是:在农业中选择合同与生产的风险有关。根据这一争论,在一个拥有不完全保险的市场中,分成制要被用于最具风险性的谷物生产以使风险容易分散。然而,经验研究却得出了与风险分散理论相冲突的结果。本文就试图将最近有关信息甄别的文献中的争论与有关分成制的文献中得出的经验观察结果联系起来。以期对最近所观察到的对工资契约、分成制以及租赁契约的使用给出一个解释。其中,对租赁合同的使用并不依赖于有关地主和佃户对风险承受能力的相对偏好这一假设。
Organization of Agricultural Land There are several distinct forms of agricultural land tendering, which tend to use wage contracts when producing certain crops, while others tend to leaseholds, while others are often divided. One popular explanation for this is that the choice of contract in agriculture is linked to the risk of production. According to this argument, in a market with incomplete insurance, the share system is used for the most risky cereal production to make the risk easy to disperse. However, empirical studies have come to terms that conflict with the theory of risk diversification. This article attempts to link the recent controversies in the literature on the screening of information with the empirical observations derived from the spin-offs. With a view to providing an explanation of the recent observed employment contracts, share-based systems and lease contracts. Among other things, the use of lease contracts does not depend on the assumption that landowners and tenants have a relative preference for risk appetite.