食品安全问题是食品生产者和政府部门联合寻租的直接结果。本文通过建立企业之间的寻租博弈模型、企业与政府部门之间的联合寻租博弈模型,分析企业与政府在产量、价格与可获得租金变化的情况下,所作出的寻租博弈行为,进而得出一般化结论:对食品生产者和政府监管部门的监督力度与处罚力度决定生产者能获得的租金大小;食品安全问题的严重程度与危害食品对安全食品的替代程度成负相关;信息公开程度和界定剩余索取权能有效地解决寻租问题以及食品安全问题。 Food safety issues are the direct result of joint rent seeking by food producers and government agencies. This paper establishes a rent-seeking game model between enterprises and a joint rent-seeking game model between enterprises and government agencies to analyze the behavior of rent-seeking games between enterprises and governments in the context of changes in production, prices, and rent availability. This leads to a general conclusion: the degree of supervision and punishment of food producers and government regulators determine the amount of rent that producers can obtain; the severity of food safety problems is negatively correlated with the degree of substitution of safe foods for foods; The level of publicity and the definition of residual claims can effectively solve rent-seeking problems and food safety issues.