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本文利用2010年中央企业开始全面实施EVA业绩评价这一自然事件,检验了业绩评价改变是否会影响企业风险承担。研究发现,实施EVA业绩评价制度后,中央企业改变了风险承担水平;当管理者拥有较低权力、较高能力以及较多薪酬激励时,实施EVA业绩评价制度后中央企业会更积极去承担风险。进一步研究发现,EVA业绩评价制度显著增加了中央企业价值。本文研究不仅丰富了企业风险承担研究内容,而且对于完善业绩评价制度和提高企业风险承担水平提供了参考。
In this paper, using the natural event that the central SOEs began to fully implement EVA performance evaluation in 2010, it examines whether the change in performance evaluation will affect the corporate risk appetite. The study found that the implementation of EVA performance appraisal system, the central enterprise has changed the level of risk-taking; managers have lower power, higher ability and more incentive pay, the implementation of EVA performance appraisal system, the central enterprises will be more active to take risks . Further study found that EVA performance appraisal system significantly increased the value of the central enterprise. The research of this paper not only enriches the research contents of corporate risk taking, but also provides reference for perfecting the performance appraisal system and raising the level of enterprise risk taking.