鉴于发展中国家发展比较落后,经济总量不强,政府的财政行为影响了社会生活的各个方面,它支配并决定了中央银行独立性的程度,铸币税问题相应也显得尤为突出。本文据此以财政支配假说为理论基础,结合铸币税问题,在介绍发展中国家中央银行独立性概况后就中国中央银行独立性问题做一分析。 Given the relatively backward development of developing countries and the fact that the total economy is not strong, the fiscal behavior of the government affects all aspects of social life. It dominates and determines the degree of independence of the central bank. The problem of seigniorage is also correspondingly prominent. Based on the hypothesis of fiscal dominance, this paper combines the seigniorage problem with the introduction of the overview of the independence of central banks in developing countries to make an analysis of the independence of China’s central bank.