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本文研究的目的是探讨博彩行为对公司盈余管理的影响。首先,使用股票报酬率的偏态系数与盈余管理做回归分析,得到偏态系数与盈余管理呈正相关关系,表明偏态系数越高,高管人员越会调高应计项;其次,由于无法说明高管人员是否会因此而误导投资人,所以本文纳入偏态系数与套利风险的交互项来进行检验,采用五种套利风险与偏态的交互作用做与盈余管理的回归分析。结果发现:第一,偏态系数越高,应计项越高;第二,成交量越小,信息不对称程度越高,套利风险越大,高管人员会选择误导投资人而调高应计项,而成交量越大,信息不对称程度越低,则套利风险越小,此时,高管人员则会指示公司未来成长而调低应计项。
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of gaming behavior on corporate earnings management. First of all, using the regression analysis of the skew coefficient and earnings management of stock returns, we get the positive correlation between the skewness coefficient and earnings management, which shows that the higher the skewness coefficient, the higher the managers will increase accruals. Second, It shows whether senior executives will mislead investors. Therefore, this article examines the interaction between skew coefficient and arbitrage risk, and uses regression analysis of the interaction between the five arbitrage risks and skewness. The results show that: firstly, the higher the skewness coefficient, the higher the accruals; the second, the smaller the turnover, the higher the information asymmetry, the higher the risk of arbitrage, executives will choose to mislead investors to increase Project, and the larger the volume, the lower the degree of asymmetric information, the smaller the risk of arbitrage, then executives will instruct the company to grow in the future to reduce accruals.