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政府技术采购作为一项公共政策工具,能够极大地推动技术创新。基于经济人动机,政府技术采购领域不可避免地存在权力租金交易。借助委托-代理理论,构建了政府技术采购的权力寻租模型。权力寻租可能带来种种社会危害,如破坏社会的生产力水平、降低公众的福利水平、导致科研单位的X-低效率。为最大限度地降低政府技术采购领域中权力寻租的规模和概率,有必要明确政府管理部门的角色定位、建立租金的消散机制、实行高薪养廉与预防寻租相结合的机制、完善对权力寻租行为的监督机制和加大对租金交易的惩罚力度。
As a public policy tool, government technology procurement can greatly promote technological innovation. Based on the motivation of the economists, there is inevitably a power rent transaction in the government technology procurement field. With the help of principal-agent theory, the government rent-seeking model of technology procurement is constructed. Rent-for-power may bring about various social hazards, such as undermining the level of social productivity and reducing the public’s welfare level, resulting in X-low efficiency of scientific research units. In order to minimize the size and probability of rent seeking in government technology procurement, it is necessary to define the role of government management, set up mechanisms to dissipate rents, implement a mechanism that combines high salaries with rent prevention, and improve the search for power Supervision mechanism of renting and intensifying penalties for rent transactions.