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日本发动九一八事变后,苏联对事变实行中立的不干涉政策,主要出于国家战略利益的考虑,即力图为其赢得一个相对和平的外部环境。不干涉政策的策略意义在于避免卷入对日冲突,不给日本制造事端提供口实,同时又可利用它作为同日本进行外交斗争的工具。但苏联在实行不干涉政策时是把中立与道义相区分的,政策上表现为中立,道义上却体现出对中国抗日军民的同情。不干涉政策的实质是一种妥协,这本身无可非议。但苏联对日妥协中有损及中国主权的因素,使不干涉政策偏离了正确轨道。不干涉政策具有复杂性,但不能得出苏联鼓励日本侵略中国的结论。
After Japan launched the Incident of September 18, the Soviet Union’s non-interventionist policy of neutralizing the incident was mainly based on the strategic interests of the country and sought to win a relatively peaceful external environment for it. The strategic meaning of non-intervention policy is to avoid getting involved in the conflict with Japan and not to provide Japan with an excuse to create an incident while at the same time using it as a tool for diplomatic struggle with Japan. However, the Soviet Union did not interfere in the implementation of the policy is to distinguish between neutrality and morality, the policy showed neutrality, moral but reflects the sympathy of China’s anti-Japanese military and civilian. The essence of a non-interference policy is a compromise, which is in itself beyond reproach. However, the factor that detrimental to China’s sovereignty in the Soviet Union’s compromise with Japan kept the policy of non-interference from being on the right track. The non-interference policy is complex, but it can not be concluded that the Soviet Union encouraged Japan to invade China.