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文章从理论与实证两个层面对中国式分权对于企业研发投入的影响及政企关系对这种影响效应的调节作用进行探讨。我们构建政企关系的替代变量:上市公司的地区经济影响力,以2008-2012年沪深两市847家上市公司共4235个样本,实证研究表明:晋升压力越大、财政分权越充分、财政收支越不平衡地区的企业,其研发投入强度越低;经济影响力正向调节了晋升压力、财政分权与研发投入的关系,即中国式分权对于经济影响力较大企业研发投入的抑制效应更为明显;进一步研究发现,经济影响力对于中国式分权与研发投入关系的调节作用在民营企业中最大,地方政府控制的国有企业次之;中央政府控制的国有企业最小。
The article discusses the impact of Chinese decentralization on R & D investment from both theoretical and empirical aspects and the regulatory effect of the relationship between government and enterprises on this impact. We build an alternative variable for the relationship between government and enterprises: the regional economic influence of listed companies, with a total of 4235 samples from 847 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2012. Empirical studies show that the greater the pressure of promotion, the fuller the fiscal decentralization, The lower the intensity of R & D investment, the lower the intensity of R & D investment. The economic influence positively adjusts the relationship between promotion pressure, fiscal decentralization and R & D investment, that is, R & D input of Chinese-style decentralization for enterprises with greater economic influence . The further study found that the economic influence has the most effect on the regulation of the relationship between Chinese decentralization and R & D investment in the private-owned enterprises, the state-owned enterprises controlled by the local government, followed by the central government-controlled state-owned enterprises.