论文部分内容阅读
指称问题是贯穿科学实在论两条基本原则(形而上学与认识论)的核心环节,它和真理问题一起构成实在论“非奇迹论证”的理论基础。以劳丹为代表反实在论针对性地提出“悲观归纳”问题,借助历史主义的案例分析方法,深刻揭示了“非奇迹辩护”推理存在的问题:科学理论的成功(包括预测和解释的成功)与其理论的指称和真理性并无因果必然联系。科学实在论针对“悲观归纳”的质疑,试图通过“拉姆齐置换”解决理论术语的指称问题,这代表了一种“结构实在论”的理论方案,它诉诸于科学理论的数学结构来答复反实在论提出的“指称”问题。
The allegation problem is the key link that runs through two basic principles of science realism (metaphysics and epistemology), and together with the truth, it forms the theoretical basis of realism and non-miracle argument. With Laudan as the representative of the anti-realism put forward the “pessimistic induction” problem, with the help of the case analysis of historicism, profoundly revealed the problems of “non-miracle defense” reasoning: the success of scientific theory (including the prediction And the success of the explanation) are not causally connected with their theoretical allegations and truths. Scientific realism, in the light of the questioning of “pessimistic induction,” attempts to solve the allegation of theoretical terms through “Ramsay permutation,” which represents a theoretical solution to “structural realism” by appealing to The mathematical structure of scientific theory answers the question of “allegation” raised by anti-realism.