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从国内发行核准制度和无市商的电子交易机制出发,借鉴知情交易操纵行为研究方法,探讨了承销增发新股中承销商与非知情策略交易之间信息识别与信息隐藏的博弈过程,考察了承销商在流通市场的操纵交易行为.得到了博弈均衡的充要条件,结果表明承销收入是博弈均衡的关键因素,增大承销收入系数,承销商倾向操纵交易,这将导致市场净指令的信息失效.控制承销收入可有效确保市场效率.
Based on the domestic issuance approval system and the market-free electronic trading mechanism, this paper explores the game process of information recognition and information hiding between the underwriters and the non-informed strategy traders in underwriting new shares with reference to the research methods of the informed trading manipulation. The results show that the underwriting income is the key factor in the game equilibrium. When the underwriting income coefficient is increased, the underwriter tends to manipulate the transaction, which will lead to the failure of the market net instruction information Control of underwriting revenue can effectively ensure market efficiency.