论文部分内容阅读
本文基于法与金融的视角,以2003-2010年我国上市家族企业为样本,研究家族企业实际控制人担任领导职务对公司治理的作用机制。本文发现与Burkart et al.(2003)的理论研究刚好相反,在法律环境较好的地区,我国家族企业实际控制人更愿意担任领导职务。本文还发现家族企业实际控制人担任领导职务有利于减少两类代理成本,增加投资效率,最终提高了企业绩效,并且这些影响在法律环境较好的地区更为显著。进一步研究还发现实际控制人担任领导职务的任期与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,而且在法律环境较好的地区,其影响更为显著,而实际控制人卸任会对家族企业绩效造成负向影响,不过法律环境越好,其负向影响越小。
Based on the perspective of law and finance, this paper takes the listed family-owned enterprises in our country from 2003 to 2010 as a sample to study the role of the actual controller of the family-owned enterprises in the leadership role in corporate governance. This paper finds that the opposite of the theoretical study by Burkart et al. (2003) shows that the actual controllers of family-owned enterprises in our country are more willing to take the leadership position in the regions with better legal environment. The paper also finds that the actual controller of the family business holds the leading position, which is beneficial to reduce the cost of the two types of agency, increase the investment efficiency and ultimately improve the corporate performance, and these effects are more significant in the legal environment. Further research also found that the actual controller’s tenure as a leader occupies an inverted U-shaped relationship with corporate performance, and the impact is more significant in areas with better legal environment, while the actual controller’s retirement will have a negative impact on the performance of family-owned enterprises However, the better the legal environment, the less negative the impact is.