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全球性公共品(GPG)是上世纪90年代以来在国际政治经济关系中备受关注的问题之一,它在组织形式、激励机制、实施方式与其它方面,都具有不同于一国内由政府提供的公共品的特殊性。与一般公共品的提供过程存在“搭车者”问题一样,在全球性公共品的提供上,由于存在三个间隙(或缺口),因此,现存的供给机制便相当薄弱:一是主权的间隙;二是参与间隙;三是动力机制上的间隙。全球性的公共品提供不足,对于发展中国家所造成的损失,一般来说,又高于对发达的工业化国家所造成的成本。美国之所以对全球性公共品的筹资态度冷漠,甚至采取反对的立场,这与美国舆论界流行的若干理论观念是有关系的。这些理论观念的一个共同特征是,把适合于一国内公共品的筹资观念简单地推广到国际范围内的公共品提供机制。
Global public goods (GPG) is one of the most concerned issues in the international political and economic relations since the 1990s. It has a different form of organization, incentive mechanism, implementation and other aspects than the one provided by the government The particularity of public goods. As with the issue of “riders” in the process of providing general public goods, there are three gaps (or gaps) in the provision of global public goods. Therefore, the existing supply mechanism is rather weak: first, the gap between sovereigns; Second, participate in the gap; Third, the gap on the power mechanism. Inadequate global public goods provide, in general, higher costs to developing countries than to developed industrialized countries. The reason why the United States is indifferent toward the financing of global public goods and even adopts an opposing position is related to a number of popular theoretical concepts in the American public opinion. A common feature of these theoretical concepts is the simple extension of the concept of financing suitable for public goods in a country to the public goods delivery mechanism in the international context.