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本文运用演化博弈理论研究了供应链中信用交易的演化过程,建立了供应商和零售商信用交易的演化博弈模型。分析了两类个体在守信与失信两种策略下的行为特征,根据复制者动态方程得到了两者的行为演化规律和政府失信惩罚机制下的行为演化和演化稳定策略,给出了从根本上消灭失信动机的惩罚区间,分析了政府失信惩罚机制的有效性,探寻国内信用制度建设的发展路径。最后,通过数值分析证明了结论的正确性。
In this paper, evolutionary game theory is used to study the evolution of credit transactions in the supply chain. An evolutionary game model of credit transactions between suppliers and retailers is established. The behavioral characteristics of two types of individuals under both trustworthiness and dishonesty are analyzed. According to the replicator’s dynamic equation, the behavioral evolution of the two and the behavioral evolution and evolutionary stability under the government’s dishonesty mechanism are given. The penalty interval for eliminating the motivation of dishonesty is analyzed, the effectiveness of the mechanism of government dishonesty and punishments is analyzed, and the development path of the domestic credit system construction is explored. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is proved by numerical analysis.