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构建了企业向消费者发送食品溯源信息的动态博弈模型,并对该模型的精炼贝叶斯Nash均衡进行求解。研究发现,“优质”企业向消费者发送足够的食品溯源信息便能实现其与“劣质”企业的分离均衡,“次优”企业则需要发送过量信息才能够取信于消费者,实现分离均衡,而增强消费者的食品安全意识,有利于发挥溯源信息发送的信号作用,实现“柠檬市场”向“优质市场”的转变。
The dynamic game model of food traceability information sent by enterprises to consumers was constructed and the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the model was solved. The study found that “high quality ” enterprises to send enough food traceability information to consumers to achieve its “inferior ” enterprises to separate equilibrium, “suboptimal ” companies need to send excess information to be able to gain the trust of consumption To achieve separation and balance, and enhance consumer awareness of food safety, traceability of information sent to help play the role of signal to achieve “lemon market ” to “high quality market ” change.