论文部分内容阅读
基于A股上市公司2009-2014年的数据,论文研究了管理层权力、大股东掏空对真实盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明:管理层权力与真实盈余管理正相关;大股东掏空引发其与管理层的合谋,对管理层权力与真实盈余管理的正相关关系起到正向调节作用;同时,管理层权力与真实盈余管理的正相关关系及大股东掏空的正向调节作用在国有企业比非国有企业显著。
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014, the dissertation studies the influence of management power and major shareholders’ hollowing on real earnings management. The results show that the management power is positively correlated with the real earnings management. The major shareholder’s hollowing leads to its collusion with the management, which plays a positive regulatory role in the positive correlation between the management power and the real earnings management. At the same time, the management power The positive correlation with the real earnings management and the positive regulatory role of the major shareholder in empting are significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.