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建立了市场需求对价格敏感、存在两个相异的竞争的零售商情形下,上游制造商创新投入降低运作成本的供应链博弈模型.研究发现上游制造商创新投入具有外部(外溢)性,在制造商创新投入下,制造商和零售商的单位产品边际利润都得到了提高,并且零售商的竞争性越强,制造商的创新投入越大.证明了在分散决策情况下,制造商的创新投入无法达到供应链整体最优,提出了使供应链达到协调的基于数量折扣的混合契约,指出了该契约可以为各方接受的条件,最后利用具体算例分析验证了结论.
A supply chain game model is established in which the market demand is price-sensitive and retailers with two different competitions exist, and the upstream manufacturers make innovations to reduce their operating costs.The research finds that upstream manufacturers have external (spillover) With innovations made by manufacturers, the marginal profits of manufacturers and retailers ’unit products have been increased, and the stronger the retailers’ competitiveness, the greater the innovation investment of manufacturers, which proves that the innovation of manufacturers under decentralized decision-making In this paper, we put forward a hybrid contract based on quantity discount which can make the supply chain reach coordination, point out the condition that this contract can be accepted by all parties, and finally verify the conclusion by the concrete example analysis.