While existing studies largely considers China’s BRI as a geoconomic and geopolitical strategy,its significant historical role and place within regional bargaining context has been neglected.China’s BRI was strategically created at a time when preexisting strategic bargains were disintegrating,and subsequently its distinctive strategic value was gradually redefined by organized interests and priorities for making new realignments alongside international cooperation.If China’s BRI is understood as a grand policy initiative,negotiating conflicting interests between China and Japan becomes an essential problematic.This research mainly argues that China’s BRI offers new regional bargaining opportunities for negotiating redistributional change in East Asia.By applying bargaining theory in international relations,it analyzes China-Japan competition as a redistributive bargaining problem.Despite its accelerating impact on intensifying China-Japan competition,China and Japan can utilize the BRI in creating joint interests on the basis of integrative approach to their developmental pragmatism.Distributive regional bargain settled over the BRI provides obtaining greater redistributional benefits while reducing security risks for both sides.This research uses this finding to draw conclusions about Japan’s deeper engagement or disengagement with the BRI in the future.It suggests that Japan’s broader engagement is critically important for the BRI’s own development and its ultimate success.It also contributes to the possibility of setting the next stage of more efficient and comprehensive regional bargain that is not confined only to regional development but even involve in security cooperation between China and Japan in East Asia.