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According to the partial target for China’s “13th Five-year plan” guideline, China will establish relatively independent and standardized electricity trading institutions, make fair and orderly market rules, and form a well-functioning electricity market. The premise of the incremental distribution network reform is to deregulate the investment entities while not influencing the interests of the existing electricity market, but motivate it by the reform instead. To a certain extent, this reform is also making an impact on the traditional electricity market and subverting the monopoly of grid companies. This paper reviews the relevant concepts of game theory, microeconomics and electricity market and studies the possible game behavior of retailers under the two types of Nash equilibria at the market opening. The main modelling approaches of this paper include:
(1) Firstly, by referring to the general bidding process and mechanism of the Japanese electricitymarket, the actual biddingmodel is simplified and the simulation of retailers’bidding strategy in the market is conducted. The dominated strategies from two retailers are eliminated and the Nash equilibrium point in the pure strategy game model is found byiterated elimination method. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium points of the game are also proved.
(2)Secondly, this paper introduces the bidding mechanism and demand response concepts in the electricity market, including the purpose of market trading mechanism designing, the overview of bidding mechanism in all types of market, and the demand response. Introducing the concepts of price elasticity matrix (PEM), this paper proposes a method for forming the PEM which can better reflect the users demand responsive characteristics. By calculating the self elasticity and cross elasticity and combining with real world electricity price data, user’s PEM are established and its elements are analyzed.
(3)Thirdly, the optimization model of retailers’electricity procurement source and cost is proposed. Under the premise of meeting the load demand of users, the short-term procurement combination optimization is discussed by adopting the MILP (mixed integer linear programming) algorithm. The procurement cost is optimized and from the following three power purchase sources: own generator units, spot market, and bilateral contracts.
(4)Finally, this paper combines the above mentioned results of PEM and optimization into retailers’ game for consideration, and the general Nash equilibrium by MCP (mixed complementarity problem) algorithm and Stackelberg subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by MPEC (mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints) are compared and discussed, in order to find the impacts of two game types on the retailers and end users in the newly deregulated market of distribution network. With comparison of the two games’ results, it proves that large-scale power retailer can take advantage of its market power, low electricity procurement cost, and diversified power purchase sources in the early stage of the newly deregulated market and mayhave a certain level of market advantage over the small to medium-sized retailers.
(1) Firstly, by referring to the general bidding process and mechanism of the Japanese electricitymarket, the actual biddingmodel is simplified and the simulation of retailers’bidding strategy in the market is conducted. The dominated strategies from two retailers are eliminated and the Nash equilibrium point in the pure strategy game model is found byiterated elimination method. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium points of the game are also proved.
(2)Secondly, this paper introduces the bidding mechanism and demand response concepts in the electricity market, including the purpose of market trading mechanism designing, the overview of bidding mechanism in all types of market, and the demand response. Introducing the concepts of price elasticity matrix (PEM), this paper proposes a method for forming the PEM which can better reflect the users demand responsive characteristics. By calculating the self elasticity and cross elasticity and combining with real world electricity price data, user’s PEM are established and its elements are analyzed.
(3)Thirdly, the optimization model of retailers’electricity procurement source and cost is proposed. Under the premise of meeting the load demand of users, the short-term procurement combination optimization is discussed by adopting the MILP (mixed integer linear programming) algorithm. The procurement cost is optimized and from the following three power purchase sources: own generator units, spot market, and bilateral contracts.
(4)Finally, this paper combines the above mentioned results of PEM and optimization into retailers’ game for consideration, and the general Nash equilibrium by MCP (mixed complementarity problem) algorithm and Stackelberg subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by MPEC (mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints) are compared and discussed, in order to find the impacts of two game types on the retailers and end users in the newly deregulated market of distribution network. With comparison of the two games’ results, it proves that large-scale power retailer can take advantage of its market power, low electricity procurement cost, and diversified power purchase sources in the early stage of the newly deregulated market and mayhave a certain level of market advantage over the small to medium-sized retailers.