在国际贸易中,反倾销作为一种保护公平贸易的措施被写进了各国的法律和国际协定之中。从法律本身意义上来说,反倾销应该是一种防御性的工具;但是从动态博弈的角度上看,一个可信的威胁也可以使反倾销成为一种攻击性或者对抗性的武器。通过对倾销与反倾销的动态博弈分析,说明进口国反倾销策略行为对出口国倾销行为“威胁的可信性”及其重要性,为政府和企业的决策层提供参考。 In international trade, anti-dumping measures as a protection of fair trade have been written into national laws and international agreements. From a legal standpoint, anti-dumping should be a defensive tool, but from a dynamic game point of view, a credible threat can also make anti-dumping an offensive or antagonistic weapon. Through the dynamic game analysis of dumping and anti-dumping, this paper illustrates the “threat credibility” and the importance of the anti-dumping tactics of exporting countries to the dumping of exporting countries, and provides a reference for the decision makers of the government and enterprises.