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“理一分殊”是朱子从哲学本体论上对于“理”的本体地位进行说明与论证的一个命题。考察朱子对于“理一分殊”的解释和论证，对于“理一分殊”可以提出一种新的理解：朱子所谓的“理一”，是指“理”是一个不可分割的整体；所谓“分殊”，是指此理随其所处之体不同而其用不同。“理一分殊”在伦理学上的功能，便是为古代儒家的名分制伦理作出论证。因此，朱子所讲“一理”与“万理”的关系，只是普遍的“理”与“理”在万物中的“用”之间的关系，而不是一般的“理”与特殊的“理”、一般规律与特殊规律之间的关系；朱子所讲的“分”，既不能从“分割”的意义来理解，也绝不能从“分有”的意义来理解。
“One Matter of Distinction” is a proposition for Zhu Zi to explain and prove the ontological status of “reason” from philosophical ontology. To examine Zhu’s explanation and argumentation of “one major distinction” and to propose a new understanding of “one major distinction”: what Zhu calls “oneness” means that “reason” is an indivisible whole; the so-called “ ”Differentiation“ means that the reason is different depending on the body in which it is located. The function of ”one major difference“ in ethics is to prove the ethics of ancient Confucianism. Therefore, the relationship between ”truth“ and ”Rinzai“ by Zhu Zi is only the relationship between the universal ”reason“ and ”reason“ in all things, rather than the general ”reason“ and the special ” Reason “and the relationship between general law and special law. The” sub-division “by Zhu Zi can not be understood from the meaning of” division “nor must it be understood from the meaning of” division. "