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股东大会法定数制度不能简单归纳为效率和公平的对立关系,它的真正价值是缩减股权分散背景下股东与管理层的代理成本,而对于解决股权集中背景下大小股东之间的代理成本作用微弱,甚至有可能适得其反。一些不顾现实盲目移植该制度的国家或地区在实践中遭遇到了很多问题,如公司采用金钱“贿赂”股东、大股东故意不参会等问题。基于我国上市公司股权较为集中、机构投资者不够发达、股东大会中心主义、投票途径的单一性以及幅员辽阔的地理环境等诸多现状,我国实施股东大会“法定数”将弊大于利,“法定数”制度不仅不能实现立法者预设的保护中小股东利益的目标,反而可能重蹈我国台湾地区的覆辙。
The legal number system of general meeting of shareholders can not be simply summed up as the antagonistic relationship between efficiency and fairness. Its true value is to reduce the agency costs of shareholders and management under the background of shareholdings, and weak to solve agency costs between large and small shareholders in the context of shareholdings. It may even be counterproductive. Some countries that illegally migrate this system regardless of reality have encountered many problems in practice, such as the use of money by companies, bribery by shareholders, and deliberate non-participation of major shareholders. Based on the fact that the equity of listed companies in our country is relatively concentrated, the institutional investors are underdeveloped, the shareholder conference generalism, the unity of voting methods and the vast geographical environment are many actualities, the implementation of the general meeting of shareholders The “statutory number” system can not only achieve the goal of protecting the interests of minority shareholders set by lawmakers, but may instead repeat the mistakes of Taiwan in our country.