目前,在对企业治理的外部监督中,分析师监督具有非常重要的作用,也受到社会各界的广泛关注。分析师的跟踪大大减少了信息不对称的程度,不仅为企业投资者提供决策有用的信息,还会对公司管理层产生压力,减少管理层的利己行为。但是,分析师的监督作用的发挥受制于国家或地区金融发展水平和市场化程度。另外,分析师所跟踪的企业的政治背景也会对分析师的监督作用产生影响。 At present, in the external supervision of corporate governance, analyst supervision has a very important role, but also by the community wide attention. Analysts’ tracking has greatly reduced the degree of information asymmetry, providing corporate investors with not only useful information for decision-making, but also putting pressure on the company’s management and reducing management’s self-interest. However, the supervisory role played by analysts is limited by the level of financial development and the degree of marketization in the country or region. In addition, the political landscape of the firms tracked by analysts can also have an impact on the analyst’s oversight.