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本文利用中国创业板制度实施导致创业板和主板IPO市场的信息不对称程度差异,实现对IPO市场信息不对称程度变化的有效计量识别,利用2009至201 1年同时为创业板及主板市场提供承销服务的投资银行承销的618个IPO样本开展实证研究。实证结果发现,创业板IPO市场信息不对称程度显著高于主板,多个变量度量的投行声誉显著降低创业板市场IPO折价率及其波动性,而在主板市场投行声誉功能不显著。创业板市场投行声誉功能为投行自身带来了更高费用收入并且也使发行公司获得更高筹资净额。
In this paper, the implementation of China’s GEM system led to the GEM and the IPO market, the extent of asymmetric information to achieve the IPO market information asymmetry changes in the effective measurement to identify the use of 2009-2011 1 at the same time for the GEM and motherboard market underwriting An empirical study was conducted on 618 IPO samples underwritten by service investment banks. The empirical results show that the IPO market information asymmetry in GEM is significantly higher than that of the main board. The reputation of investment banks with multiple variables significantly reduces the IPO discount rate and its volatility in the GEM, while the reputation function of investment banks in the main board is not significant. The investment bank’s reputation function on the GEM has resulted in higher cost revenues for investment banks themselves and has also enabled issuing companies to obtain higher net acquisitions.