本文强调一个与税收制度相关的政治成本概念,并利用西方公共选择理论就税收政策的若干方面进行探讨。文章认为,与课税有关的政治成本可以通过将税收制度置身于一相对固定不变的财政规章中来达到最小化。尽管公共选择理论已表现出了这一洞察力,但大多数的税收政策分析却通常未将公共选择因素考虑进去。 This paper emphasizes a concept of political costs related to the tax system and explores some aspects of the tax policy by using Western public choice theory. The article argues that the tax-related political costs can be minimized by placing the tax system in a relatively fixed financial regulation. Although public choice theory has demonstrated this insight, most tax policy analysis does not usually take public choice into account.