现代经济理论已证明了外部和内部机制都可以缓解代理问题,然而实证分析往往得出不同甚至矛盾的结果。本文认为不同的治理机制并不是独立运作的,可能存在某种重要的替代关系。本文运用规范分析的方法逻辑推演了董事会监督动力与两职状况、外部大股东监督、经理人员持股激励、经理人员相互监督动力之间存在重要的替代关系。 Modern economic theory has proved that both external and internal mechanisms can alleviate the agency problem, however, empirical analysis often leads to different or even contradictory results. This paper argues that different governance mechanisms do not operate independently and there may be some important alternative. This paper uses the methodological logic of normative analysis to deduce an important alternative relationship between the motivation of the board of supervisors and the two posts, the supervision of the external major shareholders, the incentive of managers and the mutual supervision power of the managers.