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通过分析证券发行管制下的地方“护租”行为研究了地方政府参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解机制:中央政府证券发行管制形成垄断租金,地方政府围绕证券发行机会的竞争使得垄断租金转化成为可占用性准租,为了辖内公司获得未来发行证券机会,避免租值转移,地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解。上述理论分析得到了经验证据的支持。以2005—2009年处于财务困境上市公司为研究样本,发现辖内上市公司处于财务困境状况对该地区未来的公司证券发行申请通过发审委审核比例存在显著影响,地方政府则会根据自身执行能力努力减少辖内上市公司处于财务困境。本文的研究对于中国转型期证券行政监管阶段性有效,特别是地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解给出了机理性解释并提供了经验证据。
This paper studies the mechanism of local governments participating in the financial distress of listed companies through the analysis of local “rent-protected ” behavior under the control of securities issuance: the monopoly rents are controlled by the issuance of securities by the central government and the competition of local governments around the opportunity of issuance of securities makes monopoly rents Converted into occupancy quasi-rent, in order to gain the jurisdiction of the company to issue securities in the future opportunities to avoid the transfer of rental value, local government actively involved in listed companies in the jurisdiction of financial distress risk resolution. The above theoretical analysis has been supported by empirical evidence. Based on a sample of financially distressed listed companies from 2005 to 2009, we find that the listed companies in financial distress have a significant impact on the proportion of applications for issuance of corporate securities by the issuance examination committee in the future. Local governments, on the other hand, Efforts to reduce listed companies in the jurisdiction of the financial difficulties. The research in this paper provides a mechanistic explanation and provides empirical evidences for the periodical effectiveness of China’s securities regulatory reform in transitional period, in particular, the local government’s active participation in the dissolution of the financial distress of listed companies in its jurisdiction.