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本文从日本、中国的国有商业银行具有高不良贷款的现实出发研究金融监管部门(代表政府,属于委托人,比如日本的大藏省或现在的金融监管厅)与国有商业银行各分支机构的经理人员(代理人)的行为。第一部分的引言强调研究金融监管部门与国有商业银行各分支机构的经理人员行为的必要性,并且对现有文献进行了回顾。第二部分研究委托人与代理人在支付矩阵下的行为。第三部分得出结论:在不考虑市场风险和预算软约束的情况下,银行不良贷款的产生是因为金融监管部门与商业银行在不同的行为参数下,各自依赖自己的行为参数从效用最大化出发进行博弈的结果。
This article starts from the fact that state-owned commercial banks in Japan and China have high levels of non-performing loans. They study the relationship between financial regulators (representing the government, clients, such as Japan’s Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervision Agency) and the managers of state-owned commercial banks (Agent) behavior. The first part of the introduction emphasizes the necessity of studying the manager’s behavior of financial regulators and branches of state-owned commercial banks, and reviews existing literature. The second part studies the behavior of principal and agent under the payment matrix. The third part concludes that under the circumstance of not considering the market risk and the soft budget constraint, the non-performing loans of banks emerge because the financial regulators and commercial banks depend on their own behavioral parameters to maximize their utility under different behavioral parameters The result of starting the game.