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为规范流转秩序、培育本地种粮主体、发展适度规模经营应运而生的政府主导农地流转竞标模式,有其现实背景和逻辑因由,并能带来规模经营比例迅速提升、主体培育加速发展等短期效应。然而,政府主导模式同时伴有某些局限并带有一定风险,具体表现为明标竞投无益于对流转价格的管控,甚至可能助推溢价,容易破坏乡里乡亲睦邻友善关系;暗标竞投下的竞标者抑价寻租有悖于均衡价格形成,易推动政府“创租”;竞标模式不可避免增加乡村治理事项,基层政府介入很难平抑好各方诉求,个别政府寻租行为加重了民众不满,使得模式成效不管有多大,政府很难全身而退,塔西佗陷阱可能越陷越深,基层政府公信力和执行力受此牵绊恐大打折扣。
In order to standardize the circulation order, cultivate the local grain-bearing subject, and develop the government-led competitive bidding mode of agricultural land that has emerged as a result of its proper scale operation, it has its realistic background and logic reasons, and it can bring about the rapid increase of the scale operation scale and the accelerated development of the main body of cultivation Short-term effects. However, the government-led model is accompanied by certain limitations and certain risks. Specifically, the open bidding is not conducive to the control of the circulating prices, and may even boost the premium and easily destroy the good-neighborly relations of the villagers in the township. Bidders underprivileged rent-seeking is contrary to the formation of a balanced price, easy to promote the government to “create rent”; bidding model inevitably increase the rural governance issues, grass-roots government intervention is difficult to stabilize the parties appeal, individual government rent-seeking behavior increased Public dissatisfaction makes the effectiveness of the model no matter how big the government will hardly get out of the way. The tragedy of Tacitus may fall deeper and deeper. The credibility and execution of the grass-roots government are greatly reduced.