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本文考察了两类代理成本如何影响会计信息可比性,并且进一步考察了企业所有权性质对两类代理成本与会计信息可比性关系的调节效应,依此探讨信息不对称和所有权性质对会计信息可比性的作用。研究发现,两类代理成本越高,会计信息可比性越低;相比而言,国有企业更多地体现为第一类代理成本对会计信息可比性的损害;非国有企业更多地体现为第二类代理成本对会计信息可比性的损害。本文的研究丰富了会计信息可比性的相关文献,是基于De Franco et al.(2011)的拓展性研究。同时,本文的结论对于提高信息使用者对会计信息可比性的理解具有积极意义,同时对监管者以及政策制定者关于如何提高会计信息可比性有借鉴意义。
This paper examines how the two types of agency costs affect the comparability of accounting information, and further examines the regulatory effects of the nature of corporate ownership on the comparability of the two types of agency costs and accounting information, and explores the comparability of information asymmetry and the nature of ownership versus accounting information. The role. The study found that the higher the cost of the two types of agency, the lower the comparability of accounting information; in contrast, state-owned enterprises are more reflected in the damage of the first type of agency costs on the comparability of accounting information; non-state-owned enterprises are more reflected in The second type of agency costs damages the comparability of accounting information. The research in this paper enriches the literature on the comparability of accounting information and is based on an extended study by De Franco et al. (2011). At the same time, the conclusions of this paper have positive significance for improving the comprehension of information users’ comparability of accounting information. At the same time, they have reference significance for regulators and policy makers on how to improve the comparability of accounting information.