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在中国转型背景和关系主导型社会结构下,民营企业的政治关联广泛存在。政治关联作为一种竞争工具能拓展民营企业的外部生存空间,为民营企业创造有利的竞争环境。然而,政治关联也增加了民营企业的成本,从而损害企业绩效。政治关联能够为民营企业带来利益掠夺效应,主要是因为政府的政策性目标和政府官员的寻租行为,其根源在于转型背景下法律保护的低效率。同时,政治关联也有助于减少民营企业的成本,增加盈利机会,从而提高企业价值。在关系主导和威权政治的模式下,民营企业与政治权力的融合容易导致权贵资本的产生,造成寻租行为的盛行与社会效率的下降。
Under the background of China’s transition and the relationship-driven social structure, the political connections of private enterprises are widespread. As a competitive tool, political connection can expand the external living space of private enterprises and create a favorable competitive environment for private enterprises. However, political affiliations also increase the cost of private enterprises, thereby undermining business performance. Political connections can bring about predatory benefits to private enterprises mainly because of the government’s policy goals and the rent-seeking behaviors of government officials. The root causes of these problems lie in the inefficiency of legal protection in the context of transformation. At the same time, political affiliations also help to reduce the cost of private enterprises, increase profit opportunities, thereby enhancing the value of the enterprise. Under the model of relationship-based and authoritarian politics, the integration of private enterprises and political power easily lead to the emergence of elite capital, resulting in the prevalence of rent-seeking and the decline of social efficiency.