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1935年底,国民政府相继召开了国民党第五次全国代表大会及五届一中全会,进行政府改组,蒋介石等政府要人及舆论均认为,中国内政得以统一,是解决中日外交问题的绝佳机会。对于改组后的国民政府及其所释放的“亲善”信号,日本外务省持疑虑及谨慎观望态度,一方面与国民政府进行“亲善”谈判,另一方面却想利用此时蒋介石在政府中的强势地位,通过日本军部在华一南一北的强压,使蒋介石彻底就范。日本军部对蒋介石及国民党向来不信任,采取打倒态度。此时,军部更是以日苏早晚发生战争作为说服点,认为国民政府从本质上难以与日本亲善,国民政府成为苏联友邦的可能性极大。日本对蒋介石新政府的认识及反应与国民政府的期许形成了巨大差异,因此双方未能把握机会,修复关系,反倒在日本军部势力急剧扩张下,走向了全面战争之路。
At the end of 1935, the National Government convened the fifth National People’s Congress and the first Plenary Session of the Fifth Plenary Session of the KMT for the reorganization of the government. Chiang Kai-shek and other government dignitaries and public opinion both believe that the unification of China’s internal affairs is an excellent solution to the diplomatic issue between China and Japan opportunity. Regarding the reorganized national government and the signal of “goodwill ” released by the government, the Japanese Foreign Ministry held the attitude of doubting and cautious on the one hand, and “goodwill ” negotiations with the Kuomintang government on the other hand, The strong position in the government, through the pressure of the Japanese military in a south China to north, enabled Chiang Kai-shek to completely defeat himself. The Japanese military took a down-to-heart attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang that they never trusted. At this moment, the military department persuaded Japan and the Soviet Union to take part in the war sooner or later. They considered it extremely unlikely that the Kuomintang government would be fundamentally difficult to become goodwill with Japan and that the national government would become a friend of the Soviet Union. Japan’s understanding of and reaction with the new government of Chiang Kai-shek formed a huge difference with the expectations of the Kuomintang government. Therefore, the two sides failed to seize the opportunity to repair their relations and, on the contrary, went to the road of full-scale war with the rapid expansion of the Japanese military forces.