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本文开始于莫诺在《偶然性与必然性》中对于辩证唯物主义的解读。恩格斯在《自然辩证法》一文中将斯宾诺莎提出的自因这一概念与黑格尔提出的相互作用这一概念相等同,这就为我们提供了一个机会,使我们能够近距离地检验莫诺的思想所造成的结果。我在本文中将会把斯宾诺莎的哲学当作石蕊试纸,通过探寻相互作用这一概念在德国古典哲学中的发展史,来证明恩格斯的唯物主义思想来源于黑格尔的《逻辑学》。斯宾诺莎提出的(自因)概念与黑格尔提出的(相互作用)概念之间有着显著的差别:相互作用这个概念意味着作为同时性而向自身显现出的一个整体,这个整体允许线性的、同质的、空的时间的存在,并且发展的不同阶段就铭刻在这种时间的流逝之中;而自因这个概念则意味着一个无法闭合的整体,这个整体的永恒性就是必然的、无限的时间模型之网。在本文的结尾,我将会指出斯宾诺莎提出的自因这个概念使得我们在危机的情况下可以侥幸重新思考自由与必然性之间的关系。
This article begins with Mono’s interpretation of dialectical materialism in “Contingencies and Necessities.” Engels, in his article “Dialectics of nature,” equating the concept of self-cause proposed by Spinoza with the one proposed by Hegel, provides an opportunity for us to examine closely The result of Monod’s thought. In this article, I will consider Spinoza’s philosophy as a litmus test paper, by exploring the history of the concept of interaction in German classical philosophy, to prove that Engels’s materialist ideas come from Hegel’s “logic ”. There is a striking difference between the concept of (self) proposed by Spinoza and the concept of (interaction) proposed by Hegel: the notion of interaction implies a manifestation of itself as a synchronicity, which as a whole allows The existence of a linear, homogeneous, empty time, and the different phases of development, are engraved in this passage of time; and the concept of self-causality implies an irreducible unity, the eternality of the whole being inevitable The web of infinite time models. At the end of this article, I will point out that the concept of self-esteem proposed by Spinoza allowed us to rejoice in the relationship between freedom and necessity in the context of crises.