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在奥卡姆的认知理论中,对个体事物的直接经验把握如何与概念性的思想相关联是一个重要问题。就直觉是心灵的真实性质而言,它也是一种心灵表征;同时,由于直觉可以作为心灵命题的主词或谓词,并且可以在此心灵命题中指代某物,因此,对奥卡姆而言,这一表征就是一种指号。根据奥卡姆关于意谓的一般理论,范畴指号被认为首先意谓它们所真实关联之物,除了这种首要意谓,“暗含”词项同时具有次意谓,因为它们间接指称某些事物。直觉行为要么作为一个心灵命题的主词或谓词单独发生,要么附属于一个概念而形成复合心灵表达式,这个复合心灵表达式同样能够作为心灵命题的主词或谓词。在这两种情况下,直觉行为都是通过纯粹的非概念方式来指派其单称指称物。奥卡姆这种特殊的基础主义的显著特征在于,这些直觉认知被看作是指号,并且可以在心灵命题中发生。
In Occam’s theory of cognition, it is an important question how to grasp the direct experience of individual things with the conceptual thoughts. Since intuition is the true nature of the mind, it is also a manifestation of the mind; at the same time, since intuition can be the subject or predicate of a spiritual proposition and can refer to something in this spiritual proposition, for Occam, This characterization is a sign. According to Occam’s general theory of intent, category signs are said to mean, first and foremost, what they are actually associated with, except for this primary meaning, where the term “implied” has sub-meanings at the same time as they indirectly refer to Something. Intuitive behavior occurs either singularly as a subject or predicate of a spiritual proposition or as a composite mental expression attached to a concept that can also be used as a subject or predicate of a spiritual proposition. In both cases, the intuitive act is to assign their singular allegations in purely non-conceptual ways. The salient feature of Ochaczas particular foundations is that these intuitions are seen as signs and can occur in spiritual propositions.