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20世纪90年代末以来,随着我国国有企业市场化改革的不断深入和民营企业的快速发展,中国深沪两市体现集团经营特点的“一控多”和“企业系”(例如“中科系”、“德隆系”等)现象大量涌现。在此类典型的金字塔结构下,源于终极现金流量权与控制权的分离和中国特有的“二元”股权分置的制度缺陷,中国上市公司中经常发生持有大额非流通股份的控制性股东利用各种关联交易(例如大股东占款、关联担保与抵押、关联购买或销售以拖欠上市公司应收帐款等)转移公司资源或利润的掏空行为,严重损害了中小投资者的利益和公司价值,从而引起了学术界的广泛关注。
Since the late 1990s, with the deepening of the marketization reform of state-owned enterprises in our country and the rapid development of private-owned enterprises, the two cities in Shanghai and Shanghai embody the characteristics of the Group’s operations such as “one control” and “enterprise” For example, “Department of ”, “Delong ”, etc.) a large number of phenomena. Under such a typical pyramid structure, the institutional defects stemming from the separation of ultimate cash flow rights and control rights and China’s unique “duality” shareholding structure, the large non-tradable shares held by Chinese listed companies frequently occur Of controlling shareholders to divert the resources or profits of the Company by various related transactions (such as the shareholding of major shareholders, related guarantees and mortgages, connected purchases or sales to defaulted the accounts receivable of listed companies, etc.) severely undermined the small and medium-sized investment People’s interests and company value, which has aroused widespread concern in academia.