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法经济学中“理性经济人”的基本假设和成本收益分析范式作为一种简单可取的解释路径,能够合理解释股东派生诉讼制度在不同国家实施效果迥异的现象。作为“理性经济人”的原告股东往往应用成本收益分析法来衡量是否提起股东派生诉讼,股东派生诉讼在某一国家是否活跃,在很大程度上取决于该国股东派生诉讼的成本风险分担规则和激励机制能否起到鼓励或者抑制诉讼的作用。针对我国上市公司股东派生诉讼案件鲜有发生的现状,我国在完善股东派生诉讼规则时,应当充分利用法经济学的理论基础和分析工具,重视法律规则在诉讼成本存在时的效率作用,并采取适当的激励机制以发挥股东派生诉讼制度的积极作用。
The basic hypothesis and cost-benefit paradigm of “rational economic man” in law and economics as a simple and acceptable explanation path can reasonably explain the phenomenon that the shareholder derivative action system has very different effects in different countries. As a “rational economic man,” the plaintiff shareholders tend to use the cost-benefit analysis to measure whether to bring a shareholder derivative lawsuit. Whether a shareholder derivative lawsuit is active in a country depends to a large extent on the cost risk of the shareholder derivative lawsuit Sharing rules and incentives can play a role in encouraging or suppressing litigation. In view of the rare occurrence of derivative cases of the shareholders of listed companies in our country, our country should make full use of the theoretical basis and analytical tools of law and economics in the process of perfecting shareholder derivative litigation rules, and pay attention to the efficiency of legal rules in the existence of litigation costs, Appropriate Incentive Mechanism to Give Full Play to the Positive Function of Shareholders Derivative Litigation System.