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随着20世纪90年代转轨初期大规模私有化过程的结束,俄罗斯主要市场参与者对产权制度的政治偏好发生了重大变化:昨天的国有资产攫取者迅速转变成为今天私有产权最有力的维护者,这为私有产权体系奠定了社会基础。对俄罗斯在1992年、1998年和2002年通过的三部破产法背后的政治经济过程的分析显示:在大规模私有化终结之后即便所有的微观个体都成为私有资产的所有人、即便所有人(包括国家利益的代表)完全认同保护私有产权的抽象目标,他们对于具体的破产制度的需求仍然在多个维度上存在重要差别,相应的政治斗争恰恰是构建市场制度的常态,后苏联俄罗斯语境中的“原始积累终结论”并未终止。
With the mass privatization process coming to an end in the early stages of the transition in the 1990s, major political players in Russia’s major market players have undergone major changes in their political preferences: Yesterday’s grab of state-owned assets quickly transformed into the most powerful defender of private property today, This laid the social foundation for the system of private property rights. An analysis of the political and economic processes behind Russia’s three insolvency laws adopted in 1992, 1998 and 2002 shows that even after all the micro-individuals have become owners of private assets after the mass privatization ended, even owners Including representatives of national interests) totally agree with the abstract goal of protecting private property rights. Their needs for a specific bankruptcy system still have important differences in many dimensions. The corresponding political struggle is precisely the norm of building a market system. The post-Soviet Russian context In the “original accumulation end ” has not been terminated.