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当俄罗斯“大爆炸”式私有化开始时,西方对俄所鼓吹的主导范式是,只要授予人们财产控制权就可以赢得他们对法治(能够保护私有产权)的支持。但是俄罗斯的实际情况并非如此,本文构建了一系列简单的模型对此予以解释。模型集中分析了在均衡状态下抑制法治需求的两种伎俩:1)资产掠夺,为人们延续非法治状态提供了机会;2)行贿,会导致对垄断的保护进而阻碍那些支持法治的政治局外人的进入。此外,本文认为政治环境具有公共物品的特性。我们所给出的结论是,鉴于理性、政治环境的公共物品特性及均衡,“大爆炸”式私有化后将很难产生对法治的支持。
When the Russian “big bang” privatization began, the dominant paradigm advocated by the West toward Russia was to win their support for the rule of law (which could protect private property rights) by granting people control of their property. However, this is not the case in Russia. This article constructs a series of simple models to explain this. The model focuses on two kinds of tricks to curb the need of the rule of law under equilibrium: 1) asset plunder provides opportunities for people to continue the state of unlawful rule; 2) bribery will lead to the protection of the monopoly and thus to the outsider who support the rule of law enter. In addition, this paper argues that the political environment has the characteristics of public goods. The conclusion we have given is that given the nature and balance of public goods in a rational and political environment, it will be very difficult to generate support for the rule of law after the “big bang” privatization.