在电力市场环境下 ,发电商竞价上网 ,按照统一边际电价结算。研究发现 ,结算规则的改变要求对购电计划模型进行相应改造 ,否则会引起不公平现象 ,且导致最终用户电价上扬。论文指出了其根本原因是传统发电计划模型中蕴涵了“一机一价”的结算规则 ,建立了反映新的结算规则的购电计划模型 ,并对新模型的本质进行了深入探讨 ,指出可以通过求解有限个线性规划问题而得到该模型的精确最优解。在此基础上 ,论文尝试考虑机组跟踪负荷速率 ,设计了动态经济调度算法。算例表明 ,该算法有效。更为重要的是 ,其思路可以扩充到拥塞管理等众多类似模型的求解算法中 In the power market environment, power generators bid on the Internet and settle at a unified marginal price. The study found that the change of the settlement rules requires the corresponding transformation of the electricity purchase plan model, otherwise it will cause unfair phenomenon, and lead to end-user electricity prices. The paper points out that the basic reason is that the traditional power generation planning model contains “one machine and one price” settlement rules, a new electricity purchase plan model reflecting the new settlement rules is established, and the essence of the new model is discussed in depth. The exact optimal solution of the model is obtained by solving a finite number of linear programming problems. On this basis, the paper attempts to consider the unit tracking load rate, and designs a dynamic economic scheduling algorithm. The example shows that the algorithm is effective. More importantly, the idea can be extended to many similar model solving algorithms such as congestion management.