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通过构造财富效用函数建立了产权协商交易定价模型,导出产权交易定价的加权边际效用零和方程.根据不同竞买人的偏好差异和对产权的预期价值差异,运用出售方与不同竞买人的加权边际效用零和的定价方程求解出对应的协商交易均衡价格,并选择最大均衡价格作为产权拍卖中标的参考价格.计算了不同中标价格的出售方和中标人的财富效用值和福利水平值,比较发现只有以最大均衡价格中标产权拍卖的福利水平和市场效率最高;若中标价格大于产权的最大预期价值,拍卖交易的福利水平为负,并出现所谓的“赢者灾难”.对竞买人用于竞标的财富实力对均衡价格的影响作了初步探讨,其研究结论符合常理.
Through the construction of wealth utility function, the pricing model of property rights negotiation is established, and the weighted marginal utility zero-sum equation of property rights pricing is deduced.According to different preferences of different bidders and differences in the expected value of property rights, we use the weighted marginal between the seller and different bidders The equilibrium price of the negotiated transaction corresponding to the zero-sum of utility is solved and the maximum equilibrium price is chosen as the reference price of the property auction.The wealth utility value and welfare level of the seller and the successful bidder with different bid price are calculated, and the comparison is found Only the auction with the highest equilibrium price has the highest welfare level and the highest market efficiency. If the bid price is greater than the maximum expected value of the property rights, the welfare level of the auction transaction is negative and the so-called “winner’s catastrophe” appears. The competitive strength of competitive bidding has made a preliminary discussion on the impact of equilibrium price. The conclusions of this study are in line with common sense.