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语言何以能够表达意义、指称事物和事态是一个不断得到讨论的问题。意识的和先验的哲学将直观事物和意义分隔在两个不同的领域,它们能够说明词语意义指称事物、事态的可能性,但不能很好地说明究竟何以平列的两个序列能够现实性地发生对应关系。不同于意识的和先验的立场,梅洛-庞蒂的语言现象学从知觉经验出发,说明语言之所以能表达意义,是由于言语是身体姿势这一原初表达形式的变形,词语意义对事物、事态的指称并非一种静态的两种先验秩序的对应,而原初地是一种非表象的自发行为,语言的观念性意义奠基于其知觉性意义之上,能够返回去指称生活世界的事物、事态。在语言的表达和指称问题上,梅洛-庞蒂的语言现象学可以克服意识的、先验的哲学立场遭遇到的表象主义困境,启发人们回到一种以原初性生活为基础的整体观。
How language can convey meaning, referring to things and events is a matter of constant discussion. Consciousness and transcendental philosophy separate intuitive things and meanings in two different fields. They can explain the possibility of referring to things and events in the meaning of the words, but they can not explain exactly why the two sequences of Ping-Ping can be realistic The corresponding relationship. Different from the position of consciousness and a priori, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of language embarks from perceptual experience, which shows that language can express meaning because speech is the deformation of the original expression of body posture. , The allegation of events is not a static correspondence between two prior orders, but is originally a non-appearance of spontaneous behavior. The conceptual meaning of language lies on its perceptual meaning, and can return to refer to the life world Things, things. On the issue of language expression and allegation, Merleau-Ponty’s linguistic phenomenology can overcome the predicament of appearanceism encountered by the conscious and a priori philosophical position and inspire people to return to a holistic view based on the original sexual life .