感觉经验的私人性似乎在逻辑上同时蕴涵不可说性和不可知性。本文在浅析几种关于私人性哲学观点的基础上,认为私人感觉虽然在某种弱式的意义上来说是现象不可说的,但我们不仅可以对其合法地宣称第一人称知识,而且也可以对其合法地宣称第三人称知识。这同时表明,我们没有必要也不可能构建所谓的私人语言来言说私人感觉的现象内容。 The personal feeling of experience seems to logically implicate unspeakable and unknowable. Based on a few philosophical perspectives on private philosophies, this paper argues that although private feeling is not phenomenal in some weak sense, we can not only claim first-person knowledge about it legally, but also Legally declare third-person knowledge. At the same time, it shows that it is not necessary or possible for us to construct the phenomenon of private feeling in the so-called private language.