论文部分内容阅读
考虑一个由制造商寡头组成的市场系统,研究非对称性假设下技术溢出和产品替代对系统成员两阶段合作创新博弈行为的影响.结果发现:合作方的技术溢出能够有效刺激企业的技术创新和产品生产;而其产品替代效应则会抑制企业的创新与生产积极性;就单个企业而言,因为着眼于自身利益最大化,只有当合作方的技术溢出水平和产品替代程度足够高时,才会有参与全合作的动力,从而实现成员企业创新与生产活动的统一协调;而从系统利润的角度来看,在任何情形下创新与生产的两阶段全合作模式均优于单阶段半合作模式.因此,建立科学的系统收益分配机制,成员企业便愿意选择全合作模式.
Considering a market system composed of oligopoly of manufacturers, this paper studies the effects of technology spillovers and product substitutions on the two-stage collaborative innovation game of system members under the asymmetry assumption.The results show that the technology spillover of partners can effectively stimulate the technological innovation and And its product substitution effect will restrain the innovation and production enthusiasm of the enterprise. For a single enterprise, because of its own interests maximization, only when the partner’s technology spillover level and product substitution degree are high enough There is motivation to participate in all-cooperation so as to achieve unified coordination between member enterprises’ innovation and production activities. From a system profit point of view, under all circumstances, the two-stage all-cooperation model of innovation and production is superior to the single-stage half-cooperation model. Therefore, the establishment of a scientific system of revenue distribution mechanism, member companies are willing to choose a full cooperation model.