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考虑了由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的单期二阶段供应链是否进行合作广告的博弈问题.面对市场需求的不确定性,零售商从制造商处订购报童类型产品销售给消费者,零售商具有风险中性的行为特征.通过不合作广告与合作广告两种情形,制造商与零售商进Stackelberg主从博弈,得到了均衡解,比较后发现,合作广告下的最优解及利润总是优于不合作广告下的最优解和利润,告诉了上下游企业采用合作广告的广告策略.最后,通过数值算例,给出了需求敏感系数对最优决策的影响,同时也论证了有关结论.
Considering the game problem of cooperative advertisement whether the single-phase two-stage supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer.Under the uncertainty of market demand, the retailer orders the newspaper-type products from manufacturers to sell to consumers, Retailers are risk-neutral behavioral characteristics.By non-cooperative advertising and cooperative advertising two cases, manufacturers and retailers into the Stackelberg game from the master-slave game, obtained an equilibrium solution, the comparison found that cooperative advertising under the optimal solution and profit Always superior to the optimal solution and profit under the uncooperative advertising, and tells the upstream and downstream enterprises to adopt advertising strategy of cooperative advertising.Finally, through the numerical examples, the influence of the demand-sensitive coefficient on the optimal decision is also given The conclusion.