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1982年《宪法》第三条第四款实际上并未规定中央与地方关系的具体规范模式,而更多地体现为一种探索性的政治理念。中国的国家结构形式及其制度设计内涵丰富,远非“单一制”所能概括。在宪法基本原则与具体制度设计之中,存在着集权与分权的张力,这一张力随着财税体制的变迁在不同时期显现出不同的样态。1994年以来的分税制改革尤其是财政转移支付制度强化了中央集权趋势,进而对宪法所规定的地方分权自治结构形成冲击,扰动了央地关系宪政构架的微妙平衡。而财税体制对央地关系实际运作状况的影响,根源仍在于宪法制度构架的内在逻辑。宪法所蕴合的现代化建设的国家理性可在一定意义上赋予第三条第四款以规范性意涵,从而化解制度张力。
Article 3, paragraph 4, of the 1982 Constitution did not in fact stipulate the specific normative model of the relations between the central and local authorities, but more as an exploratory political concept. China’s national structure and its system design are rich in connotation, far from the “single system” can be summed up. Among the basic constitutional principles and the design of specific systems, there is tension between centralized and decentralized powers. This tension shows different patterns in different periods with the changes in the fiscal and taxation system. Tax-sharing reforms since 1994, especially the fiscal transfer payment system, have intensified the trend toward centralized power, which in turn has created an impact on the decentralized autonomy of local governments as stipulated in the Constitution and disturbed the delicate balance of the constitutional structure of the relations between the central and pakistan. However, the root of the influence of fiscal and taxation system on the actual operation of the relations between the central and the mainland lies in the inherent logic of the constitutional system framework. The national rationality of the modernization construction implied by the Constitution can, in a certain sense, give the third paragraph of Article 3 its normative meaning so as to resolve the tension of the system.