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It is remarkable how the economic debate that has dominated political life over the past decade in Britain and much of Europe—how austere1 should we be？—is completely irrelevant to our current crisis， as if that argument sits in a parallel economic universe that we no longer inhabit.
过去十年间，在英国和欧洲大部分地区，主导政治生活的经济争论是我们的财政该紧缩到什么程度，而此论题与当前危机毫不相干，仿佛那是在我们已经离开的平行经济宇宙中进行的。这种现象不同寻常。
Instead of arguing about how swiftly governments should balance the books2 and lower their debt levels， leading economists are suddenly making the case for3 much more aggressive public spending. The U.K.’s Office for Budget Responsibility， traditionally a guardian of fiscal prudence， now advises the British government to spend “what you need to spend to deal with this. In some ways it’s like a wartime situation.”
大牌经济学家不再争论政府应以多快的速度平衡收支、减少债务，而是突然间倡导大幅增加公共支出。英国预算责任司传统上是财政节流的卫士，如今却建议英国政府“为此该花多少钱就花多少。在某种程度上，目前形势和战时情况一样”。
If this is right， what lessons might we learn from “wartime economics”—beyond a cautionary reminder that the standard economic tools available to us （cutting interest rates， carefully increasing government spending） are no match for the magnitude of the moment？
假如这种判断是正确的，我们可以从“战时经济学”中得到什么启发呢——除了告诫我们可用的标准经济手段（降低利率、谨慎增加政府开支）无法抵抗目前形势的严重性之外？
First， we should acknowledge the peculiar paradox4 at the core of this crisis， that although we are confronting an economic calamity5， no actual economic weaknesses are to blame. The economy has not been leveled by bombs—we have simply turned it off. This creates a unique challenge： How do you support people during this moment of suspended animation6， and ensure that， when we switch the economy “back on，” it is able to propel itself into action， unscarred by this pause？ Some of the traditional lessons of war， thus， don’t apply. Today， for example， a crucial economic challenge is that consumer demand has been decimated7 by the virus. In contrast， what troubled John Maynard Keynes， the British economist， at the start of the Second World War was the possibility of too much demand. That combined with a shortage of supplies due to the war effort， he feared， would lead to explosive inflation. His solution， a compulsory saving scheme， is precisely the opposite of what we need.
首先，我們要承认，目前处于危机核心的特殊悖论是，尽管我们面对经济危难，却无法将其归咎于某些实际的经济疲软。经济不是被炸弹摧毁的——是我们让它停止了。这造成了一个独特的挑战：如何在经济停摆的这一时刻援助民众，并且确保经济在重启之时，自己会推进盘活、不受停摆的影响？因此，一些传统的战时经验教训不适用。比如说，现在，一个关键的经济挑战是消费需求因为病毒而大幅度下降。相比之下，第二次世界大战开始时，困扰英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的是需求过剩的可能性。再加上战争导致的供应短缺，他担心需求过剩将导致爆炸性的通货膨胀。他的解决方案——强制性储蓄计划——恰恰与我们现在所需的措施相反。 One lesson that we have learned， more from necessity than historical reflection， is the need for effective “big government，” for competent top-down planners to take the place of chaotic bottom-up markets. We have seen the state step forward in many countries to offer huge amounts of support for workers—in the U.K.， for example， by underwriting8 almost the entire private sector through wage guarantees. And we have seen the state take a role in mobilizing and redirecting resources—medical staff， volunteers， equipment， and much else—toward the “war effort.”
我們已得到的一条教训是，我们需要高效的“大政府”，让能干的自上而下的规划者取代混乱的自下而上的市场，这个教训与其说是来自历史反思，还不如说是源于现实必要性。我们已看到，在许多国家，政府采取措施为劳动者提供大量支持——例如，英国政府通过工资保障为几乎整个私营部门提供担保。而且我们还看到，国家在调动和重新分配资源方面发挥了作用，将医疗人员、志愿者、设备等众多资源用于“抗疫战争”。
Yet， in practice， the most important lessons we can learn from wartime economics are likely not those that teach us what to do now but those that give us a glimpse of the challenges and debates we will face in the future， once the war is over.
然而，实际上，我们能从战时经济学中得到的最重要的启示可能不是教我们现在该做什么，而是让我们初步领悟到一旦抗疫战争结束将面临的挑战和争论。
To begin with， few countries have been able to respond to this crisis alone. Almost none has had the domestic capacity to produce sufficient tests， masks， medication9， or ventilators10 when the moment required. The U.S.， for instance， relies on China for 90 percent of its antibiotics11. Just as Keynes found himself， in the interwar period， reflecting on the merits of economic self-sufficiency， we will soon likely find ourselves further ensnared12 in debates about “strategic protectionism，” about the merit of intentionally building and shielding particular nationally important parts of the economy， even if to do so runs counter to the basic economic principle of comparative advantage.
首先，鲜有国家能独自应对这场危机。几乎没有国家能在需要时生产足够的检测剂、口罩、药物或呼吸机。例如，美国90%的抗生素产自中国。在两次世界大战间隔期，凯恩斯在反思经济自给自足的益处。和他一样，我们可能很快会进一步陷入有关“战略保护主义”的辩论，争辩有意构建和保护本国特定重要经济部门有何好处，即便这种措施违背了比较优势的基本经济原则。
If the U.K. had done this， we might have avoided the ongoing scrambles13 to secure sufficient ventilators， tests， and protective equipment; we could have built up the domestic capability to produce far more ourselves. On testing， for instance， the U.K.’s health secretary， Matt Hancock， noted in March that “we didn’t go into this crisis with a huge diagnostics14 industry.” In preparing for the next pandemic， we may want to change that.
如果英国采取了这种措施，我们可能就不会陷入当前为确保有足够的呼吸机、检测剂和防护设备而与人争抢的困境;我们本来可以增强国内生产力，自己制造更多的产品。例如，在检测方面，英国卫生大臣马特·汉考克在3月份指出，“我们陷入这场危机之时，尚无庞大的诊断产业。”在为应对下一次流行病做准备时，我们或许需要改变这种状况。 We should see a transformation in the way we view certain types of work， as well. The Second World War catalyzed15 a shift in women’s treatment in the labor market， and this crisis may similarly force us to address another working-world flaw： the gap between the great social value of so many jobs， and the comparatively small market value （in the form of a salary） that they receive. In Britain， for instance， labeling doctors， nurses， care workers， social workers， teachers， criminal lawyers， and others as “key workers” betrays a two-fold irony： Though these roles are key （and have been for some time）， that status is in many cases not reflected in their pay; and some of them are precisely the sorts of so-called low-skilled workers that post-Brexit immigration controls would keep out.
我們对某些类型工作的看法也应改变。第二次世界大战催生了劳动力市场中女性待遇的转变，而这场危机可能同样迫使我们解决另一个职场上的问题：有那么多工作，其社会价值巨大，所获的市场价值（以工资的形式）相对很小。例如，在英国，医生、护士、护理人员、社会工作者、教师、刑事律师和其他人被贴上“重要岗位工作人员”的标签，这暴露了一个双重讽刺：虽然这些角色是至关重要的（并且长期以来一直如此），但在许多情况下，这种地位并没有反映在他们的薪酬中;其中一些人恰恰是所谓的低技能工人，英国脱欧后的移民管制会将他们拒之门外。
A third lesson is to monitor market competition， or the lack of it. A common complaint in the first half of the 20th century was that war conditions were particularly favorable to monopolization16： Certain companies were either favored by the state or well placed to take advantage of the war effort， and many smaller firms struggled， eventually being bought out by larger ones with deeper pockets. We can see similar trends unfolding in this crisis： Companies such as Amazon， Netflix， Facebook， and Zoom17 find themselves providing the goods and services that are necessary at the moment， while others， typically smaller businesses without the financial wherewithal18 to stay afloat19， are in trouble through no fault of their own. During the First and Second World Wars， excess profit taxes， levied on profits above prewar levels， were used to make sure no company benefited disproportionately20 at a time of great national suffering. We shouldn’t just consider using these taxes again， but， in time， we should also survey the general health of different sectors， checking that they are still characterized by healthy competition， rather than dominated by a lucky few who have managed to survive.
第三个启示是要监控市场竞争，或监控缺乏市场竞争的情况。20世纪上半叶的一个通病是战争条件特别有利于垄断：某些公司要么受到政府照顾，要么处于可以利用战事的优势地位，而许多小公司苦苦挣扎，最终被财力雄厚的大公司收购。在这场危机中，我们可以看到类似的趋势：亚马逊、奈飞、脸书和Zoom等公司在提供目前必需的商品和服务，而其他公司（通常是没有资金维持运营的小型企业）却陷入了非自身原因造成的困境。在第一次和第二次世界大战期间，对高于战前水平的利润征收超额利润税，以确保在国家蒙难时没有公司发国难财。我们不应只是考虑重新启用这种税收措施，最终，我们还是应该调查不同行业的总体状况，检查它们是否仍然具备良性竞争，而不是由少数存活下来的幸运儿支配。
The final lesson from wartime economics—and the most significant—relates to the future of the state. Having stepped forward to deliver so much in the crisis， the state seems unlikely to simply retreat to its former shape and size once this is all over， given it has not done so in the past. Many of Europe’s strongest welfare states found their initial form in the postwar moments of the first half of the 20th century. The same， I imagine， will happen in our time. Much as wartime economics did not cease when the world wars ended， the consequences of this “war” will be felt for long after it concludes.
战时经济学的最后一个启示——也是最重要的启示——与国家的未来有关。疫情危机期间，国家挺身而出，付出了那么多。危机结束后，国家的经济似乎不太可能一下子恢复到疫情之前的状态和规模，因为这种情况过去没有发生过。欧洲许多最强大的福利国家是在20世纪上半叶的战后时期初步成形的。我想，同样的情况也会发生在我们这个时代。正如二战结束后战时经济并未停止，在疫情结束后相当长一段时间内，我们还会感受到这场“抗疫战争”的影响。
过去十年间，在英国和欧洲大部分地区，主导政治生活的经济争论是我们的财政该紧缩到什么程度，而此论题与当前危机毫不相干，仿佛那是在我们已经离开的平行经济宇宙中进行的。这种现象不同寻常。
Instead of arguing about how swiftly governments should balance the books2 and lower their debt levels， leading economists are suddenly making the case for3 much more aggressive public spending. The U.K.’s Office for Budget Responsibility， traditionally a guardian of fiscal prudence， now advises the British government to spend “what you need to spend to deal with this. In some ways it’s like a wartime situation.”
大牌经济学家不再争论政府应以多快的速度平衡收支、减少债务，而是突然间倡导大幅增加公共支出。英国预算责任司传统上是财政节流的卫士，如今却建议英国政府“为此该花多少钱就花多少。在某种程度上，目前形势和战时情况一样”。
If this is right， what lessons might we learn from “wartime economics”—beyond a cautionary reminder that the standard economic tools available to us （cutting interest rates， carefully increasing government spending） are no match for the magnitude of the moment？
假如这种判断是正确的，我们可以从“战时经济学”中得到什么启发呢——除了告诫我们可用的标准经济手段（降低利率、谨慎增加政府开支）无法抵抗目前形势的严重性之外？
First， we should acknowledge the peculiar paradox4 at the core of this crisis， that although we are confronting an economic calamity5， no actual economic weaknesses are to blame. The economy has not been leveled by bombs—we have simply turned it off. This creates a unique challenge： How do you support people during this moment of suspended animation6， and ensure that， when we switch the economy “back on，” it is able to propel itself into action， unscarred by this pause？ Some of the traditional lessons of war， thus， don’t apply. Today， for example， a crucial economic challenge is that consumer demand has been decimated7 by the virus. In contrast， what troubled John Maynard Keynes， the British economist， at the start of the Second World War was the possibility of too much demand. That combined with a shortage of supplies due to the war effort， he feared， would lead to explosive inflation. His solution， a compulsory saving scheme， is precisely the opposite of what we need.
首先，我們要承认，目前处于危机核心的特殊悖论是，尽管我们面对经济危难，却无法将其归咎于某些实际的经济疲软。经济不是被炸弹摧毁的——是我们让它停止了。这造成了一个独特的挑战：如何在经济停摆的这一时刻援助民众，并且确保经济在重启之时，自己会推进盘活、不受停摆的影响？因此，一些传统的战时经验教训不适用。比如说，现在，一个关键的经济挑战是消费需求因为病毒而大幅度下降。相比之下，第二次世界大战开始时，困扰英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的是需求过剩的可能性。再加上战争导致的供应短缺，他担心需求过剩将导致爆炸性的通货膨胀。他的解决方案——强制性储蓄计划——恰恰与我们现在所需的措施相反。 One lesson that we have learned， more from necessity than historical reflection， is the need for effective “big government，” for competent top-down planners to take the place of chaotic bottom-up markets. We have seen the state step forward in many countries to offer huge amounts of support for workers—in the U.K.， for example， by underwriting8 almost the entire private sector through wage guarantees. And we have seen the state take a role in mobilizing and redirecting resources—medical staff， volunteers， equipment， and much else—toward the “war effort.”
我們已得到的一条教训是，我们需要高效的“大政府”，让能干的自上而下的规划者取代混乱的自下而上的市场，这个教训与其说是来自历史反思，还不如说是源于现实必要性。我们已看到，在许多国家，政府采取措施为劳动者提供大量支持——例如，英国政府通过工资保障为几乎整个私营部门提供担保。而且我们还看到，国家在调动和重新分配资源方面发挥了作用，将医疗人员、志愿者、设备等众多资源用于“抗疫战争”。
Yet， in practice， the most important lessons we can learn from wartime economics are likely not those that teach us what to do now but those that give us a glimpse of the challenges and debates we will face in the future， once the war is over.
然而，实际上，我们能从战时经济学中得到的最重要的启示可能不是教我们现在该做什么，而是让我们初步领悟到一旦抗疫战争结束将面临的挑战和争论。
To begin with， few countries have been able to respond to this crisis alone. Almost none has had the domestic capacity to produce sufficient tests， masks， medication9， or ventilators10 when the moment required. The U.S.， for instance， relies on China for 90 percent of its antibiotics11. Just as Keynes found himself， in the interwar period， reflecting on the merits of economic self-sufficiency， we will soon likely find ourselves further ensnared12 in debates about “strategic protectionism，” about the merit of intentionally building and shielding particular nationally important parts of the economy， even if to do so runs counter to the basic economic principle of comparative advantage.
首先，鲜有国家能独自应对这场危机。几乎没有国家能在需要时生产足够的检测剂、口罩、药物或呼吸机。例如，美国90%的抗生素产自中国。在两次世界大战间隔期，凯恩斯在反思经济自给自足的益处。和他一样，我们可能很快会进一步陷入有关“战略保护主义”的辩论，争辩有意构建和保护本国特定重要经济部门有何好处，即便这种措施违背了比较优势的基本经济原则。
If the U.K. had done this， we might have avoided the ongoing scrambles13 to secure sufficient ventilators， tests， and protective equipment; we could have built up the domestic capability to produce far more ourselves. On testing， for instance， the U.K.’s health secretary， Matt Hancock， noted in March that “we didn’t go into this crisis with a huge diagnostics14 industry.” In preparing for the next pandemic， we may want to change that.
如果英国采取了这种措施，我们可能就不会陷入当前为确保有足够的呼吸机、检测剂和防护设备而与人争抢的困境;我们本来可以增强国内生产力，自己制造更多的产品。例如，在检测方面，英国卫生大臣马特·汉考克在3月份指出，“我们陷入这场危机之时，尚无庞大的诊断产业。”在为应对下一次流行病做准备时，我们或许需要改变这种状况。 We should see a transformation in the way we view certain types of work， as well. The Second World War catalyzed15 a shift in women’s treatment in the labor market， and this crisis may similarly force us to address another working-world flaw： the gap between the great social value of so many jobs， and the comparatively small market value （in the form of a salary） that they receive. In Britain， for instance， labeling doctors， nurses， care workers， social workers， teachers， criminal lawyers， and others as “key workers” betrays a two-fold irony： Though these roles are key （and have been for some time）， that status is in many cases not reflected in their pay; and some of them are precisely the sorts of so-called low-skilled workers that post-Brexit immigration controls would keep out.
我們对某些类型工作的看法也应改变。第二次世界大战催生了劳动力市场中女性待遇的转变，而这场危机可能同样迫使我们解决另一个职场上的问题：有那么多工作，其社会价值巨大，所获的市场价值（以工资的形式）相对很小。例如，在英国，医生、护士、护理人员、社会工作者、教师、刑事律师和其他人被贴上“重要岗位工作人员”的标签，这暴露了一个双重讽刺：虽然这些角色是至关重要的（并且长期以来一直如此），但在许多情况下，这种地位并没有反映在他们的薪酬中;其中一些人恰恰是所谓的低技能工人，英国脱欧后的移民管制会将他们拒之门外。
A third lesson is to monitor market competition， or the lack of it. A common complaint in the first half of the 20th century was that war conditions were particularly favorable to monopolization16： Certain companies were either favored by the state or well placed to take advantage of the war effort， and many smaller firms struggled， eventually being bought out by larger ones with deeper pockets. We can see similar trends unfolding in this crisis： Companies such as Amazon， Netflix， Facebook， and Zoom17 find themselves providing the goods and services that are necessary at the moment， while others， typically smaller businesses without the financial wherewithal18 to stay afloat19， are in trouble through no fault of their own. During the First and Second World Wars， excess profit taxes， levied on profits above prewar levels， were used to make sure no company benefited disproportionately20 at a time of great national suffering. We shouldn’t just consider using these taxes again， but， in time， we should also survey the general health of different sectors， checking that they are still characterized by healthy competition， rather than dominated by a lucky few who have managed to survive.
第三个启示是要监控市场竞争，或监控缺乏市场竞争的情况。20世纪上半叶的一个通病是战争条件特别有利于垄断：某些公司要么受到政府照顾，要么处于可以利用战事的优势地位，而许多小公司苦苦挣扎，最终被财力雄厚的大公司收购。在这场危机中，我们可以看到类似的趋势：亚马逊、奈飞、脸书和Zoom等公司在提供目前必需的商品和服务，而其他公司（通常是没有资金维持运营的小型企业）却陷入了非自身原因造成的困境。在第一次和第二次世界大战期间，对高于战前水平的利润征收超额利润税，以确保在国家蒙难时没有公司发国难财。我们不应只是考虑重新启用这种税收措施，最终，我们还是应该调查不同行业的总体状况，检查它们是否仍然具备良性竞争，而不是由少数存活下来的幸运儿支配。
The final lesson from wartime economics—and the most significant—relates to the future of the state. Having stepped forward to deliver so much in the crisis， the state seems unlikely to simply retreat to its former shape and size once this is all over， given it has not done so in the past. Many of Europe’s strongest welfare states found their initial form in the postwar moments of the first half of the 20th century. The same， I imagine， will happen in our time. Much as wartime economics did not cease when the world wars ended， the consequences of this “war” will be felt for long after it concludes.
战时经济学的最后一个启示——也是最重要的启示——与国家的未来有关。疫情危机期间，国家挺身而出，付出了那么多。危机结束后，国家的经济似乎不太可能一下子恢复到疫情之前的状态和规模，因为这种情况过去没有发生过。欧洲许多最强大的福利国家是在20世纪上半叶的战后时期初步成形的。我想，同样的情况也会发生在我们这个时代。正如二战结束后战时经济并未停止，在疫情结束后相当长一段时间内，我们还会感受到这场“抗疫战争”的影响。