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排除论证旨在拒斥不可还原的心灵属性的因果效力,对非还原物理主义而言,这一论证可能是最为严峻的挑战。许多业已提出的对排除问题的解答仅能拒斥掉排除论证的简单版本,却无法封阻我所引入的精致版本。在这篇论文中,我试图表明我们可以通过诉诸一种对因果性的精致理解来拒斥精致版排除论证,我称之为“因果性的双重条件观”。具体而言,我会论证因果性的双重条件理论对所谓的“自主性解答”提供了有力的支持,这一解答主张,即使心灵属性不能引起(基础的)物理属性,它们仍可引起高层属性(例如心灵的、行为的和社会的属性)——如果是这样,人类的能动性便可以在物理世界中被保留下来。
Exclusionary argumentation aims to reject the causal effect of non-reducible psychic attributes, which may be the most serious challenge for non-reductive physicalism. Many of the proposed solutions to the problem of exclusion can only reject a simple version of the exclusionary argument but can not block the refined version that I have introduced. In this essay, I try to show that we can reject the excerpt from the exquisite argument by resorting to a sophisticated understanding of causality, which I call the “dual condition of causality.” Specifically, I will argue that the theory of dual conditions of causality provides strong support for the so-called “autonomy solutions,” which argue that psychic attributes can cause even the (basic) physical attributes of psychic attributes to evoke High-level attributes (such as spiritual, behavioral and social attributes) - if so, human inactivity can be preserved in the physical world.