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虚拟股的定性观察决定了虚拟股股东的保护机制的二分选择:是从债的合同中心主义还是从股的章程中心主义。然一元保护机制在变动不居的市场背景下皆有不周延之处存在盲区,尤其在公司主体发生重大变化如解散、收购时,虚拟股股东的失语处境使其无法得到应有的公允保护。而合同为主的路径过分强调了合同的可实现内容,所遮蔽掉的是变动不居的市场环境,信息不对称的先前存在,以及权利义务自由安排的可选择性。为此在后金融危机时代,针对虚拟股股东的保护路径也急需从二分法则的单边主义向碎片化的多元主义做以应时转化,还原虚拟股协议的劳动合同属性,比附优先股制度,在合同原则的统领下引入声誉资本等替代机制。
The qualitative observation of the virtual stocks determines the dichotomy between the protection mechanisms of the virtual stockholders: from the contract-centering of debt or from the chartering of the stock. However, there is a blind spot in the unvarying mechanism of the uniformed protection mechanism in the fluctuating market environment. Especially in the event of major changes such as the dissolution and acquisition of the main body of the company, the aphasia of the virtual shareholder can not obtain the fair protection due to it. The contract-based approach places too much emphasis on the achievable content of the contract. It obscures the volatile market environment, the pre-existence of information asymmetry, and the optional nature of the freedom and obligation arrangements. Therefore, in the post-financial crisis era, the path of protection against the shareholders of virtual shares also urgently needs to be changed from the unilateralism of dichotomy to the fragmented pluralism in a timely manner. The reduction of the labor contract property of the agreement on the virtual stock is more effective than the preferential stock system, Under the guidance of the principle of contract to introduce alternative mechanisms such as reputation capital.