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在社会转型的过程中,中国地方政府的目标函数与西方经济理论中有关政府的假设不同,中国地方政府更关注本地经济的高速增长,而将安全水平稳定在适当程度即可,政绩考核制度则进一步强化了地方政府的这种偏好。在这种外部环境约束下,我们证明,地方政府为了完成政绩考核指标,往往偏离最优决策,这种偏离不仅使经济发展水平受到影响,还会增加安全事故死亡人数,上述过程则伴随着显著的规制波动。作为当前中国地方经济发展的一个显著特征,规制波动是由于地方政府在进行煤矿安全规制时,受所追求目标函数变化的影响,不断地对规制强度进行调整,缺乏稳定性所造成的。这种波动造成了政府公信力水平下降,生产成本提高,煤矿企业经营预期降低等负面影响。
In the process of social transformation, the objective function of Chinese local government is different from that of the relevant government in western economic theory. Chinese local governments are more concerned about the rapid growth of the local economy, while maintaining the safety level at an appropriate level. However, the performance evaluation system This preference is further reinforced by local governments. Under this external environment, we prove that local governments often deviate from the optimal decision-making in order to complete the performance evaluation index. Such deviation not only affects the level of economic development, but also increases the number of safety accidents, which is accompanied by significant Regulatory changes. As a notable characteristic of the current local economic development in China, the fluctuation of regulation is due to the influence of the changes in the objective function of the pursuit of coal mine safety regulation by local governments and the constant adjustment of the regulation intensity caused by the lack of stability. Such volatility has caused the negative impact of the government’s credibility, higher production costs and lower operating expectations of coal mining enterprises.