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在研究黑格尔《精神现象学》的内容时,应该同时研究其体系学的形式。1807年的现象学是建立在诸逻辑基本环节的某种序列的基础上的,而这种序列与黑格尔当时的逻辑学构想是相一致的,并且在现象学内具有一种统一的功能。要弄清这些基本规定之进程,有着诸多困难。在现象学的布局中的修改并没有走到损害现象学之逻辑根基的地步。本文第一章表明,从一开始,黑格尔就提出了这一要求:在非实在的意识的方式与逻辑的环节之间要有一种严格的对应。第二章讨论这些逻辑的环节作为什么进入意识的经验当中,以及它们如何组织意识的经验。第三章具体说明这些逻辑的基本环节的序列及其同意识的诸阶段的对应。文章最后还把一种有关现象学的方法和有关耶拿逻辑学的发展的见解,提出来进行了讨论。
In studying the content of Hegel’s “psycho-phenomenology”, we should also study the form of its systematic study. The phenomenology of 1807 was based on a certain sequence of basic logic, which was consistent with Hegel’s conception of logic at the time and had a unified function within phenomenology. There are many difficulties in understanding the process of these basic provisions. Changes in the phenomenological layout have not come to the damaging of the logical roots of phenomenology. The first chapter of this paper shows that from the very beginning, Hegel has put forward this demand: There should be a strict correspondence between non-realistic ways of consciousness and logic. Chapter 2 discusses what these logical aspects are entering into the experience of consciousness and how they organize the consciousness of experience. Chapter III specifies the sequence of basic elements of these logics and their correspondence to the phases of consensus. The article concludes with a discussion of phenomenological methods and insights on the development of Jena’s logic.