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以中国2007-2012年间A股市场制造业上市公司发生CEO变更的企业为研究对象,以CEO自主权为解释变量,以高管薪酬水平为因变量,应用基于配对样本分析的多元回归方法开创性地研究和比较了不同资历的CEO运用其自主权操纵高管薪酬的机理与动机。研究发现,新任CEO自主权与高管薪酬的相关性显著低于资深CEO,且新任CEO自主权能够显著促进高管薪酬与公司绩效的正相关性以及高管薪酬与知识合作需求的正相关性,而资深CEO自主权则在一定程度上弱化高管薪酬与二者的正相关性。该结果证实,新任CEO和资深CEO虽然都能够通过其自主权实质性地操纵高管薪酬,但新任CEO是以利企性的间接操纵效应为主,而资深CEO则是以利己性的直接操纵效应为主。
Taking the change of CEO in manufacturing listed companies in A-share market between 2007 and 2012 in China as the research object, taking the CEO autonomy as the explanatory variable and the executive pay as the dependent variable, a multivariate regression method based on paired-sample analysis was adopted. Studied and compared the mechanisms and motivations of different senior executives using their discretion to manipulate executive compensation. The study found that the correlation between the new CEO’s autonomy and executive compensation is significantly lower than that of senior CEO, and the new CEO autonomy can significantly promote the positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance and the positive correlation between executive compensation and knowledge cooperation needs , While the senior CEO autonomy is to some extent weakened the positive correlation between executive compensation and the two. The result confirms that although both the new CEO and the senior CEO can control the executive compensation substantially through their own autonomy, the new CEO is mainly based on the indirect manipulation effect of benefiting the enterprise, while the senior CEO is self-serving direct manipulation Effect-based.